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“Everybody knows about Mississippi Goddam” 
  Nina Simone1 
“Ceci n’est pas une pipe”2 
INTRODUCTION 
Academic and policy discussions dealing with the State of Israel’s 
control of the West Bank and Gaza strip (WBGS), are permeated by 
judgments about legality. Whenever confronted with an institutional 
imperative to act in reaction to any political, economic, or 
security/military development in the WBGS, discussions among 
academics, policy makers or governmental and non-governmental 
institutional actors working on the ground are quickly framed as 
questions of whether this development is legal. As observed by Ben-
Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli, “legality” in the context of these 
discussions overwhelmingly refers to the question of “Israel’s 
compliance or noncompliance with its obligations as an occupying 
power (. . .)”.3 The vocabulary, style of arguments, and the reference 
criteria for these discussions about legality are found in international 
humanitarian law—specifically the law of occupation as well as 
international human rights law. The role-play that these discussions 
systematically re-enact is one in which participants howl at each other 
arguments of condemnation and justification. 
Ben-Naftali et al. also correctly and meticulously argued that the 
routinization of this style of arguments and counter-arguments has 
operated to legitimize the occupation. Thus, the continuous exchange 
of arguments about Israel’s compliance and non-compliance with its 
obligations as an occupying power obfuscated the exceptional and 
prolonged character of Israel’s control over the WBGS and 
constrained the normative horizons of policy discussions and political 
 
1 NINA SIMONE, Mississippi Goddam, on NINA SIMONE IN CONCERT (Philips Records 
1964).  
2 René Magritte, La trahison des images (The Treachery of Images) 60 x 81cm oil on 
canvas, Los Angeles County Museum of Art (Belgium 1929). 
3 Oran Ben-Naftali et al., Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 551, 551–52 (2005). 
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controversies.4 Indeed, the reiteration of arguments and counter-
arguments about the legality of certain policies under the law of 
occupation is symptomatic of the indeterminacies and blurring of 
boundaries (occupation–non-occupation, annexation–non-annexation, 
temporary–indefinite, rule–exception) that characterize Israel’s 
relationship with WBGS. In all the debates about say the legality of 
the separation barrier, the building of settlements, land expropriations, 
or targeted assassinations Israel’s continuing control of the WBGS 
remains a given. Suppose that the legality of any measure by the 
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the WBGS was challenged before the 
Israeli High Court of Justice on the ground that it is inconsistent with 
the law of occupation. The outcome of such case may, for instance, 
alter the conditions for when land can be expropriated,5 or might even 
alter the path of the separation barrier.6 These alterations could very 
well introduce marginal changes in how the WBGS are governed and 
will most certainly produce winners and losers among Israelis and 
Palestinians. Even more, an in depth analysis of the sum of winnings 
and of losses may lead us to the conclusion that the change in the 
regime governing WBGS make the Palestinian civilian populations 
under occupation as a group better off in their relationship with the 
occupier compared to the situation ex ante. These changes however 
would not alter the background structure of the relationship between 
Israel and WBGS. The fact of occupation, and inequality between 
occupier and occupied hardwired into the law of occupation, would 
remain the invisible frame of reference and an institutional constraint 
limiting any improvement in the relative position of the occupied 
civilians vis-à-vis the occupying power. 
It would appear then, that the discourse of condemnation vs. 
justification that underlays much of scholarly and policy discussions 
about Israel’s control of the WBGS has produced the paradoxical 
situation in which the more practices of the occupying power are 
audited for compliance with the legal regime of occupation, the more 
the systemic connections between these practices become invisible 
and immune to critical evaluations. I will not attempt to explain why 
the discourse of condemnation and justification became so 
predominant. Perhaps these compulsive reiterations of legal 
 
4 Id. at 609–12. 
5 PAL. Y. B. INT’L L. 134, 150 (1984) (translating HCJ 390/79 Dweikat v. Government 
of Israel [1979] (Isr.)). 
6 HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel [2005] (Isr.). 
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condemnations and justifications are the way international lawyers 
sublimate their political bias or conflicts in an issue that legal 
scholarly circles have always considered as politically contentious or 
sensitive. Or maybe, it is another manifestation of the historic trend 
since the end of the Second World War towards more convergence 
and cross-fertilization of international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law.7 Instead, I would like to explore the 
implications of two insights brought to the foreground by the 
preceding discussions. 
First, there is the curious and normatively significant observation, 
that the conceptual and doctrinal tools available to international 
lawyers to engage the legal status of the WBGS have a blind spot that, 
in the long run, legitimized Israel’s control of the WBGS. 
International lawyers have had difficulties in capturing and 
incorporating in their analysis the systemic aspects of the occupation, 
and were immersed in quarrels on the legality of certain actions taken 
within it.8 Second, a key project to overcome this legitimation effect 
would be one that contributes to articulating a legal perspective from 
which the systemic connections between the different practices of the 
occupying power are visible and the object of critical evaluations. 
Ben-Naftali et al. engaged that project by centering their analysis 
around the question of the legality of the occupation per se.9 They 
meticulously reconstruct both international law and the law of 
occupation to articulate the foundational principles that can serve as 
the normative reference to distinguish between legal and illegal 
occupations. Their reconstruction analytically assumes that the 
question of the legality of the occupation per se is distinct and 
logically independent from the question of whether the occupier is 
complying with the norms constituting the regime of occupation.10 
In this Article, I also propose to contribute to the project of 
articulating a legal perspective from which the systemic connections 
between the practices or policies of the occupying power in the 
WBGS are visible. My contribution builds on the argument of Ben-
Neftali et al., but parts company along the way to take a different 
route. I subscribe to the parts of their analysis in which they 
 
7 Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239 
(2000). 
8 Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 3, at 551–52. 
9 Id. at 555. 
10 Id. at 609; see infra note 20. 
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effectively demonstrate how the structure of the legal discourse on the 
WBGS has operated to legitimize the occupation. At the same time, I 
argue that centering analysis on the question of the legality of the 
occupation per se does not resolve or, perhaps more accurately, 
avoids the indeterminacies they have identified (occupation–non-
occupation, annexation–non-annexation, temporary–indefinite). The 
question of the legality of the occupation per se merely carries these 
indeterminacies to a different level. This is particularly visible if one 
attempts to incorporate the Gaza disengagement in their framework.11  
Furthermore, from the perspective of the project of making the 
systemic character of Israel’s occupation of the WBGS visible, the 
focus on the question of legality of the occupation per se has the 
following two disadvantages. 
First, reorienting the conversation to focus on legality of the 
occupation is not neutral. This reinforces a number of 
legal/institutional assumptions. For example, the question of whether 
Israel’s occupation of the WBGS is legal will have to assume that as 
occupied territories the WBGS are distinct territorial units. This 
assumption more concretely means that as “occupied territories” the 
WBGS have a special governance regime. Actions of the occupying 
power are determined by the situation inside the WBGS, and reflect a 
pragmatic balancing of considerations of military necessity and 
humanity. One significant negative aspect of such an assumption is 
that it shifts attention away from the role of the structural dynamics 
between Israel and the WBGS in determining how the governance of 
the WBGS has evolved over a long period. Second, the focus on the 
legality of the occupation per se is not politically neutral, to the extent 
that it implicitly incorporates a specific substantive position on the 
future of the Palestinians and the nature of the political solution to the 
conflict.12 
 
11 Ben-Neftali, supra note 3, at 551 (footnote 3 specifically excluded from the scope of 
their paper the disengagement from Gaza and its impact on the question of the legality of 
the occupation per se as opposed to the legality of certain actions of the Israel Defense 
Forces). On the legal debate about the legal consequences of Gaza disengagement see 
Claude Bruderlein, Legal Aspects of Israel’s Disengagement Plan under International 
Humanitarian Law, PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH 
(Nov. 2004), http://www.dci-pal.org /english/Doc/GUA/DisEng/LegalDiseng.pdf. 
12 I refer specifically to the two-states solution embodied in the Oslo Accords, and later 
confirmed with the Quartet’s “Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-States 
Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” (“Road-map”). See Press Statement, U.S. 
Dep’t of State, A Performance Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Apr. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Roadmap], http://2001-2009 
.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm. There are left and right critiques of the two states  
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These difficulties confronting the project of articulating a legal 
perspective that makes visible the occupation itself, to use the 
expression in Ben-Neftali et al. are not unique to their approach. They 
are in fact the expression of a more general analytical bias they share 
with the mainstream legal perspectives on Israel’s relationship with 
the WBGS. The mainstream perspective assumes that Israel’s control 
of the WBGS is a concrete example of the more abstract and universal 
legal institution of occupation. International humanitarian law, and 
the law of occupation more specifically, provide, first and foremost in 
the mainstream perspective, an analytical grid of intelligibility for all 
the concrete practices of Israel as an occupying power. Legal analysis 
in the mainstream approach is a matter of comparing the concrete 
practices of the occupying power with the abstract norms of the law 
of occupation. In other words, in the context of mainstream legal 
perspectives on the WBGS and occupation, legal analysis can best 
described as a project of indexing the differences between, on the one 
hand, the concrete practices of the occupying power; and, on the 
other, an idealized image of the occupation regime and the rights, 
powers, privileges, and duties of the occupier implied in it. 
In contrast this paper turns the mainstream legal discourse on 
Israel’s control of the WBGS on its head. The starting point of my 
research is a simple question: How are the WBGS actually governed?  
This question can be broken down into several, more basic questions. 
What are the different regulatory instruments or practices that are 
used to govern the WBGS? How are these different governmental 
practices conceptually linked together? Formulated differently, the 
question is how are these different practices of governance 
rationalized to work together in the best possible way? My analysis 
will attempt to provide the answer without deducing the elements of 
the regime that govern the WBGS from an abstract definition of 
occupation.13 
This reorientation of the legal discourse on the WBGS will bring to 
the surface several aspects in the regime governing these territories 
 
solution among Israelis and Palestinians. These reflect intense political debates among 
Israelis and the Palestinians on how to understand the conflict and the elements of a final 
settlement for the conflict. A map of the different positions among Palestinians and Israelis 
is outside the scope of this paper. It suffices to emphasize that the two-states solution may 
not express a consensus among Palestinians and among Israelis. 
13 See generally Lecture Series: Michel Foucault, Naissance de la Biopolitique: Cours 
au Collège de France (1979) (following the line of analysis), available at http://www.lib 
.berkeley.edu/MRC/foucault/nb.html. 
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that are usually latent in the mainstream discourse. First, governing 
the WBGS involves a multiplicity of formal and informal regimes, 
spread vertically on many levels of governance. The interaction 
among these regimes and their effects on shaping space, the lives of 
their inhabitants, and the distribution of fortunes amongst them can 
hardly be described or explained through a hermeneutic of the rules of 
the international law of occupation. A rethinking of governance in the 
WBGS from a perspective outside the framework of the law of 
occupation might reveal that many governing practices in the WBGS 
are not unique to their situations as occupied territories and can better 
and more accurately described as adaptations of Israeli internal 
policies formulated in the context of a state building project and the 
management of territory and populations consistent with it. Moreover, 
such a perspective would make it possible to observe how the law of 
occupation itself was instrumental in facilitating the control of 
territories by one group of people, as well as the dispossession and 
subordination of another. 
Second, the perspective of the law of occupation ignores the role of 
third parties in governing the WBGS. The fact of occupation (or “the 
effective control of a power . . . over a territory to which that power 
has no sovereign title, without the volition of the sovereign of that 
territory”)14 generates a set of legal relationships between the 
occupying power and the occupied populations. Governing practices 
within the framework of the law of occupation are the responsibility 
of the occupying power. The actions and governing practices of third 
parties, in particular donor countries or international relief and 
development assistance agencies, no matter how deeply involved, are 
marginal and in many instances invisible. A holistic view of 
governance in the WBGS, one that decenters the framework of the 
law of occupation, reveals a curious trend towards more involvement 
of donors in the actual governance of the WBGS and a working 
division of labor with Israeli authorities. From this perspective, there 
is a world of Hohfeldian privileges15 that shape the governing 
practices of donors and aid agencies and that reflect unacknowledged 
policy choices affecting the present situation in the WBGS and the 
normative horizons for political resolution of the conflict. 
 
14 EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 4 (1993). 
15 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 
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Third, and perhaps most importantly, considering the multiple 
governance regimes, actors and policies implemented cumulatively in 
the WBGS since 1967, the insistence of mainstream legal discourse 
on describing Israel’s control of the WBGS as an occupation, as 
understood in international humanitarian law, is ideological. It is 
ideological in the simple sense that describing Israel’s control of the 
WBGS as an occupation is a “representation of the imagined 
relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.”16  
The ideological character of this representation implies, first and 
foremost, that it is a constitutive element in the governing structure in 
the WBGS. In other words, describing Israel’s relationship with 
WBGS as occupation is in itself an instrument of Israeli control over 
the Palestinian populations in the WBGS. It contributes to the 
reproduction of the relations of domination between Israel and the 
Palestinians. 
I develop this argument in two stages. In Part II, I propose an 
account of governance in the WBGS particularly since the outbreak of 
the second Intifada (September 2000). I describe the transformation 
of Israel’s control on the WBGS since 1967 towards a system of a de 
facto final settlement of the territorial dispute between Israel and the 
Palestinians, and of the pending issues including Jerusalem and the 
right of return. I argue that a key instance in this transformation is the 
Israeli Gaza disengagement plan, which henceforward would be the 
template for dealing with all areas where there is a demographic 
concentration of Palestinians. 
In Part III, I critically reexamine the structural legal account of the 
system of control that has congealed in the WBGS since September 
2000. I argue that the legal account of governance in the WBGS as 
belligerent occupation is inadequate for two reasons. First, 
descriptively the governance regime that congealed in the WBGS, 
does not fit the most widely accepted understanding of occupation in 
international humanitarian law. Second, assuming arguendo that 
Israel’s relationship with the WBGS can be best described as 
occupation, such description would inevitably have to qualify 
essential aspects of governance in the WBGS (i.e., regime features 
that are constitutive and have persisted overtime) as merely 
aberrations. Finally, in the conclusion I outline the policy implications 
of my argument and the challenges confronting international lawyers’ 
 
16 LOUIS ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in LENIN AND 
PHILOSOPHY, AND OTHER ESSAYS 162, 162 (Ben Brewster trans., 1971). 
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engagement with the Palestinian right to self-determination, 
particularly in light of the United Nations General Assembly’s 
Resolution on the status of Palestine in the United Nations.17 
I 
THE BARE OCCUPATION 
In this section I propose an analysis of the regime of Israeli control 
over the West Bank and the Gaza strip since the outbreak of the 
Second Intifada in September 2000. I demonstrate how, during this 
troubled decade, Israel has managed to alter its mode of control so as 
to hold on to the effective military control over the territories while 
abdicating any governing responsibility towards the civilian 
populations under its military control. 
The separation between governance and control does not represent 
a fundamental change in Israel’s approach to the occupied Palestinian 
territories. But it does announce the onset of a new stage18 in the 
history of Israeli occupation that could be best described as Gaza-
fication. The term refers to the generalization of an existing trend in 
Israel’s policy towards Gaza to encompass the parts of the West Bank 
that were categorized under Oslo as area A, containing the major 
Palestinian-populated areas. In this context, the Gaza Disengagement 
Plan in 2005 is not a policy unique to Gaza, but the template for a 
new mode of Israeli control of the Palestinians structured around the 
separation between military control and governance of people. This 
mode of control is new for at least two reasons. First, it is new 
because it represents a different mode of structuring the relationship 
between the Palestinians and the Israeli economy. The difference is 
most clearly manifest in the regulation, specifically the reduction to 
the absolute minimum of Palestinian labor flows to the Israeli 
economy. Second, it is new because contrary to previous regimes, 
disengagement is understood by the political and military 
establishment in Israel as final rather than a transitory arrangement 
awaiting the outcome of the peace process. 
 
17 G.A. Res. 67/19, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/19 (Nov. 29, 2012). 
18 Oren Yiftachel, Neither Two States Nor One: The Disengagement and “Creeping 
Apartheid” in Israel/Palestine, 8 ARAB WORLD GEOGRAPHER 125, 125–26 (2005); 
Ghazi-Walid Falah, The Geopolitics of ‘Enclavisation’ and the Demise of a Two-State 
Solution to the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, 26 THIRD WORLD Q. 1341, 1341–42 (2005). 
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A. A Governance Matrix 
During the period between 1967 and 1994, the Israeli government 
put in place a governing regime organized around ethnic distinctions 
and functional differentiations. There was on the one hand a regime to 
govern Palestinians, their property, villages, urban centers and 
unregistered lands. And there was, on the other hand, a regime to 
govern Israeli residents in the WBGS and in the settlements. 
Furthermore, and cutting across the Palestinian/Israeli distinction, the 
Israeli occupation also differentiated between military/security and 
civilian affairs in its treatment of people, territory, and governmental 
functions. 
The distinction between civilian governance and military control 
and security is not analytically grounded in a specific theoretical 
framework that describes the state, or the functions of modern 
governments. It was more a function of the specificities of how the 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has evolved 
since 1967. What counts as military control over the territory is not a 
matter of localized responsibility to establish public order. It does not 
include, for instance, the localized control that the Oslo Accords 
assigned to the Palestinian security apparatus in area A. In the 
WBGS, as it was governed by Israel since 1967, security and/or 
military control is a residual power enjoyed by the Israeli army by 
virtue of its qualitative superiority over any competing 
military/security force, as well as its ability to project military power 
anywhere in the WBGS. Similarly, governance over civilians is much 
less clear, but in the context of Israeli rule over the WBGS, it came to 
be associated with the power to administer the life of the Palestinians 
residents of the WBGS as a group, in the aggregate.  This includes, 
for instance, the public law power to set and pursue macroeconomic 
goals, public health, education policy, or population policy. Such a 
delimitation of the different spaces for governance does not reflect a 
distinction between two logically independent categories, or between 
two causally independent spheres. 
Despite considerable developments in the way the WBGS were 
governed, the formalization and maintenance of the ethnic distinction 
(Palestinian vs. Israeli residents in the WBGS and in the settlements) 
and functional differentiation (military/security vs. civilian) remained 
a constant in the various territorial rearrangements, military 
redeployments, institutional and legal restructuring and peace plans 
that followed the launching of the Oslo process. As noted by 
Palestinian lawyer Raja Shehadeh the Oslo regime “would not have 
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been possible had [these distinctions] not constituted an operative 
principle of the Israeli occupation long before the negotiations had 
begun.”19 Accordingly it is possible to heuristically conceptualize 
governance in the WBGS as a process of interaction between four 
different regimes that can be represented using the following schema: 
 
Figure 1: Governance Matrix in the WBGS 
 Military/Security Civilian Affairs 
Israeli residents in 
the WBGS and 
Settlers 
  
Palestinians 
  
Within this schema, ethnicity is destiny. The functional 
differentiation between civilian and military affairs, on the other 
hand, is one of opportunity. In other words, over the long years of 
occupation and during the Oslo years, the Israeli government has 
introduced legal and institutional changes, the effect of which was to 
change whether certain matters were treated as military/security or 
civilian affaires to serve immediate policy objectives. The Military 
Commander’s order no. 947 (November 8, 1981), carving out a 
bundle of governmental functions from the jurisdiction of the military 
commander to establish the civilian administration for Judea and 
Samaria,20 is perhaps the clearest example of such rearrangements of 
opportunity. The Oslo Accords also give numerous examples of the 
malleability of the military/civilian distinction inside the governance 
matrix of WBGS. 
On the Israeli WBGS residents’ side of the matrix, the clearest 
example of the malleability of the military civilian distinction could 
be found in settlement policies and the different mechanisms to seize 
land in the WBGS for the purpose of constructing settlement. During 
 
19 RAJA SHEHADEH, FROM OCCUPATION TO INTERIM ACCORDS: ISRAEL AND THE 
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 79 (1997). 
20 See Jonathan Kuttab & Raja Shehadeh, Civilian Administration in the Occupied West 
Bank, Analysis of Israeli Military Government Order No. 947, AL-HAQ (Jan. 1982), 
http://www.alhaq.org/publications/publications-index/item/civilian-administration-in-the   
-occupied-west-bank. 
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the period 1968–1979, Israel seized almost 47,000 dunums21 of 
private land for the purposes of building settlements. The key 
justification for the seizure orders was that the settlements performed 
defense and military functions. This justification was consistent with 
the government discourse at the time about its policies in the newly 
occupied West Bank, particularly in the Allon plan.22 However, and 
as a result of the High Court’s decision in the Elon Moreh case 
rejecting the government’s use of security to justify land seizures in 
the West Bank,23 the Israeli government resorted to a combination of 
administrative tools to continue its seizure policy, including 
declaration of land as state land24 or as absentee property,25 
expropriation for public needs, and through zoning, urban 
development plans, tax incentives, and other forms of government 
grants and subsidies.26 Finally, and following the Oslo Accords, the 
Israeli army issued a number of requisition orders to construct a 
network of bypass roads connecting the settlements with Israeli urban 
centers inside the green line.27 The government argued, and the High 
Court upheld the argument, that these orders are justified by “absolute 
security needs.”28 The military commander always issued land seizure 
orders. What made a seizure order a military/security affair had 
nothing to do with administrative pedigree.29 In the period before 
Elon Moreh case, and later in the case of bypass roads, the military 
commander issued the seizure orders by virtue of his authority as an 
occupier that enjoyed effective military control on the WBGS. In the 
remaining cases, the military commander issued the seizure orders in 
 
21 YEHEZKEL LEIN WITH EYAL WEIZMAN, LAND GRAB: ISRAEL’S SETTLEMENT 
POLICY IN THE WEST BANK 48 (Yael Stein ed., Zvi Shulman & Shual Vardi trans., 2002) 
(1 dunum = 0.247 acre). 
22 Yigal Allon, Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 38 (1976) (a 
rearticulation of the Allon plan for a Jordanian solution to the Palestinian question first 
articulated in 1967). 
23 HCJ 390/79 Dweikat v. Government of Israel [1979] (Isr.). 
24 LEIN & WEIZMAN, supra note 21, at 51. 
25 Id. at 58. 
26 Id. at 73. 
27 Samira Shah, On the Road to Apartheid: The Bypass Road Network in the West 
Bank, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 221, 223 (1997). 
28 LEIN & WEIZMAN, supra note 21, at 50. 
29 Joel Singer, The Establishment of a Civil Administration in the Areas Administered 
by Israel, 12 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 259, 278 (1982) (this article cites a 1982 interview 
published at the Jerusalem Post dated 19 Feb. 1982, where the Head of the Civil 
Administration stated, “Civil administration does not mean that this is an administration 
operated by civilians, but an administration dealing with the affairs of civilians”). 
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application of Jordanian public laws and administrative procedures as 
amended during the occupation. 
But these rearrangements of opportunity between matters civilian 
and military/security were constrained by, and remained within the 
bounds of the ethnic distinction between Palestinians and Israeli 
residents in the WBGS and in the settlements. As described by 
Palestinian lawyer Raja Shehadeh, the formalization and 
consolidation of an ethnic distinction in the governance of the WBGS 
had a curious genealogy. It started by extending the application of 
certain Israeli laws extra-territorially (i.e., beyond the Green Line) to 
include Israeli citizens living in the WBGS including criminal laws 
(1967). Later in 1982, the applicability of a series of laws including 
Entry into Israel Law, Chamber of Advocates Law, Income Tax 
Ordinance, and National Insurance Law was extended to include 
those in the WBGS who were entitled to Israeli citizenship pursuant 
to the law of return.30 The military commander also enacted a number 
of regulations that excluded the settlements and other areas and land 
under Israeli ownership and control from the military and civil 
administration of the WBGS, including the creation of regional 
councils and other local councils and the creation of the “Courts of 
domestic jurisdictions” applying Israeli laws in the same areas.31 By 
1994, Israeli residents in the WBGS and settlers lived in a regulatory 
enclave. Their spaces, forms of community life, and legal privileges 
and duties are regulated by Israeli civilian institutions and regulations.  
In effect, since 1967 ethnicity has been “the main determinant of the 
allocation of rights, powers and resources”32 in the WBGS. 
Finally, the four regimes in the matrix are not independent from 
each other. The correlative of a military/security regime of movement 
restrictions for the Palestinians is a civilian regime of economic 
investment in infrastructure, and tax incentives to support a regime of 
free movement of the settlers between the WBGS and Israel of the 
green line. Correlation in this context means that the regime of 
restricted movement for the Palestinians and free movement for the 
 
30 SHEHADEH, supra note 19, at 91–92. 
31 Id. at 88–89, 92–93. See also RAJA SHEHADEH, THE LAW OF THE LAND: 
SETTLEMENTS AND LAND ISSUES UNDER ISRAELI MILITARY OCCUPATION 36–44 (1993); 
EYAL BENVENISTI, LEGAL DUALISM: THE ABSORPTION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 
INTO ISRAEL 3–15 (1990); LEIN & WIEZMAN, supra note 21, at 67–71. 
32 OREN YIFTACHEL, ETHNOCRACY: LAND AND IDENTITY POLITICS IN 
ISRAEL/PALESTINE 16 (2006). 
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Israelis are one and the same regime described from the perspectives 
of the Palestinians and Israeli residents of the WBGS respectively. 
B. Gaza-fication of the Occupation 
For the Israeli political and military establishment Gaza always 
represented more of a  demographic. More concretely, this meant that 
the guiding concern for Israel’s policies in the Gaza strip has been one 
of containing Palestinian demographic presence and movement in 
order to preserve the Jewish character of the state. On the other hand, 
the West Bank presented a territorial problem. In other words, the 
problem for the military and political establishment in relationship to 
the West Bank was essentially one of figuring out how to manage the 
military occupation of 1967 so as to incorporate more territories from 
the West Bank to Israel. The main justification for these territorial 
ambitions was articulated in terms of secure and defensible 
boundaries.33 Between 1972 and 1992, Israel constructed 132 
settlements housing 231,200 Israelis in the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem.34 In contrast during the same period, Israel constructed in 
Gaza only 16 settlements housing 4,800 Israelis.35 
After the successful fragmentation of the West Bank by the 
combination of settlement activities, bypass roads, and the separation 
barrier, Israel’s territorial ambitions in the West Bank have reached 
an upper limit. Short of ethnic cleansing and forced population 
transfers,36 Israel cannot hope to annex more land from the West 
Bank. The consequence is to turn the fragments of Palestinian 
populated areas in the West Bank into what Lagerquist described as a 
“residual curiosa in an Israeli landscape stretching from the 
 
33 Allon, supra note 22, at 39; World Zionist Federation, Settlement in Judea and 
Samaria: Strategy, Policy and Plans (Sept. 1980), available as an annex to UN Doc. No. 
A/36/341, S/14566 (19 June 1981) (Letter from the Acting Chairman of the Committee on 
the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to the Secretary-General); 
see also Rami S. Abdulhadi, Land Use Planning in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 
19 J. PALESTINE STUD. 46, 47–51 (1990). 
34 Leila Farsakh, Palestinian Labor Flows to the Israeli Economy: A Finished Story?, 
32 J. PALESTINE STUD. 13, 20 (2002). 
35 Id. 
36 Some have made the argument that the routing of the separation barrier in 
combination with Military Order No. 378 (Oct. 2, 2003) declaring “closed” the zone 
between the separation barrier and the 1967 borders, is in fact a prelude to actual 
population transfer. See Peter Lagerquist, Fencing the Last Sky: Excavating Palestine after 
Israel’s “Separation Wall,” 33 J. PALESTINE STUD. 5, 21 (2004). 
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Mediterranean to the Jordan River.”37 From an Israeli perspective, this 
has transformed the Palestinian problem in the West Bank to one of 
managing population growth, and movement. From the perspective of 
the Israeli establishment the priority objective in managing 
Palestinian population growth and movement would be to defend 
against what they perceive as a threat to the “ethnic character of the 
state.”38 This also meant that the mode of Israeli control and 
containment in Gaza would henceforward be the template for control 
and containment in the West Bank. I develop further this narrative by 
distinguishing between three stages. 
1. Expansion, Integration and Dispossession (1967–1994) 
From 1967 to 1994, civilian functions of government were actually 
aspects of the military and security control over the WBGS. During 
this period, the administration of Palestinians under occupation was 
ultimately in the hands of the Israeli prime minister and a small 
ministerial committee in which the minister of defense had direct 
responsibility over the occupied territories. Policy decisions relating 
to the Palestinians as a group (including economic policies, tax 
policies, land planning and development, infrastructure development, 
health and education) were integrated in the Israeli governmental 
system.39 Policy decisions were implemented by two ministerial sub-
committees and channeled through the Ministry of Defense 
(Department for Coordinating Operations) to the military 
administration in the WBGS.40 The military government’s civilian 
budget was always included in the budget of the Ministry of 
Defense.41 According to Meron Benvenisti, the WBGS “never 
constituted a fiscal burden on the Israeli treasury.”42 In fact, and 
primarily through taxes and deductions imposed on Palestinians 
 
37 Id. at 6. 
38 Yiftachel, supra note 18, at 126. 
39 Mona Rishmawi, The Administration of the West Bank under Israeli Rule, in  
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: TWO 
DECADES OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP 267–68 
(Emma Playfair ed., 1992). 
40 Id. 
41 Hisham Jabr, Financial Administration of the Israeli Occupied West Bank, in  
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: TWO 
DECADES OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP 390 (Emma 
Playfair ed., 1992). 
42 MERON BENVENISTI, DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC, LEGAL, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST BANK 30 (1987). 
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employed officially in Israel, Palestinians contributed large sums to 
Israeli public consumption.43 In comparative terms Palestinians in the 
WBGS ended up more taxed than Jordanians and Israelis.44 
During this period, three transformations are particularly relevant 
for the purpose of this paper: 
a. Mainstreaming the Settlements 
There was first what can be best described as the mainstreaming of 
the settlements in the West Bank. Mainstreaming of the settlements in 
the context of the West Bank refers to the process through which the 
position of the settlements in Israel (both geographically and 
regulatory) has become ambiguous. On the one hand, West Bank 
settlements can be considered as frontiers and the settlers as pioneers 
both notions being central to nation building in settler-societies. On 
the other hand, these same settlements have evolved to become 
suburbs of the major Israeli urban centers. Mainstreaming could be 
best traced by distinguishing between three stages45 of the 
development of settlement in the West Bank, all within a governance 
matrix that distinguishes sharply on the basis of ethnicity between 
Palestinian Arabs, and Israeli Jews. 
The first stage ran between 1967 and 1974, and it was a period of 
consensus about the goals of the settlement policies. During this 
period, the Israeli government thought of the West Bank and Gaza as 
assets for future negotiations. Settlement activities were authorized 
mainly for military/security purposes along what was later referred to 
as the “Allon Plan.”46 Accordingly settlements were encouraged along 
the Jordan valley and in East Jerusalem. The main forms of 
settlements created during this period (outside east Jerusalem) were 
agricultural cooperative communities. As mentioned earlier, land 
seizures from the Palestinians were realized mainly as temporary 
measures for military necessity. 
The second stage ran between 1974 and 1977, and was a period of 
controversy about the goals of the settlement policy. The mainstream 
Labor Party-controlled government remained committed to the Allon 
Plan. The counterpoint, represented by the movement Gush 
 
43 Id. 
44 Jabr, supra note 41, at 382 (Table 12.1. Comparison of income tax paid by taxpayers 
in Jordan, Israel, and the Occupied Territories). 
45 See infra Table 1: Three Stages of Settlement Policy in the West Bank. 
46 Allon, supra note 22. 
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Emunim,47 was ideologically committed to the religious idea that the 
entire historic Palestine is a promised land to the Jewish people. But it 
was also committed to the idea that settling the frontiers and 
Judaizing the land are essential to modern Zionism. This meant that, 
contrary to the Allon Plan, the settlement priorities should be the 
central parts of the West Bank, Judea and Samaria. In addition to the 
continuation of the settlement activity along the Jordan valley and in 
Eastern activity, there were a number of confrontations between the 
Labor controlled Israeli government and Gush Emunim, including of 
course the famous situation of the Elon Moreh settlement and the 
High Court decision.48 According to B’Tsalem, “between July 1974 
and December 1975, members of Gush Emunim made seven 
unsuccessful attempts to establish a settlement at various sites in the 
Nablus area without government permission.”49 
The third stage ran between 1977 and 1993, and this period was 
again a period of consensus about the goals of the settlement policy.  
The mainstream (the Likud controlled Israeli government and Gush 
Emunim) adopted World Zionist Organization settlement plan50 as 
implemented by the Sharon Plan. During this period, the Israeli 
Government reversed its relationship to the West Bank. 
Henceforward, the future annexation of land from the West Bank 
became strategically vital. The Israeli government made it a priority 
to settle the central parts of the West Bank around major Palestinian 
demographic centers. During this stage, the mechanism for land 
seizures shifted from the ostensibly temporary measures justified by 
military necessity to reclassifying land as state land. The process 
seems to have started in 1968 when the Israeli government suspended 
the process of land registration that began in Palestine during the 
 
47 For information on Gush Emunim and its role in the settlement of the WBGS, see 
David Newman, Jewish settlement in the West Bank: the role of Gush Emunim, 16 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES, U. DURHAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC STUD. 
(1982); David Newman & Tamar Hermann, A Comparative Study of Gush Emunim and 
Peace Now, 28 MIDDLE E.STUD. 509 (1992); Elisha Efrat, Jewish Settlements in the West 
Bank: Past, Present and Future, 1 ISR. AFF. 135, 139–43 (1994); LEIN & WEIZMAN, supra 
note 21, at 13; David Newman, From Hitnachalut to Hitnatkut: The Impact of Gush 
Emunim and the Settlement Movement on Israeli Politics and Society, 10 ISR. STUD. 192 
(2005); Robert H. Mnookin & Ehud Eiran, Discord “Behind the Table”: The Internal 
Conflict Among Israeli Jews Concerning the Future of Settlements in the West Bank and 
Gaza, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 11, 20–21 (2005). 
48 HCJ 390/79 Dweikat v. Government of Israel [1979] (Isr.). 
49 LEIN & WEIZMAN, supra note 21, at 13. 
50 Drobless, supra note 33. 
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British Mandate (1928).51 This was followed by transferring massive 
areas to the ownership of the Israeli state and registered in a special 
register (1974) that was eventually “merged with the Israel Lands 
Administration Authority, where Israeli state lands are registered.”52 
Land was also seized as a result of regional planning schemes 
particularly ones relating to the building of roads in the West Bank.53 
In addition to land seizures, and starting with the Sharon Plan, the 
Israeli government went far in providing a package of incentives54 to 
attract settlers to the West Bank. These measures transformed the 
dynamic of settlement in the West Bank from one of pioneering and 
settling the frontiers to one of suburbanization. The main settlement 
communities that emerged during this stage were mostly gated 
communities and “bedroom, dormitory settlements,”55 that attracted 
mainly ex-urban, Ashkenazi middle class, professionally based in the 
major urban centers in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. 
In settlement as suburbanization, the 1948 armistice borders of the 
West Bank, or the Green Line, are visible and invisible, porous and 
impermeable. The Green Line is porous for Israeli citizens living in 
the settlement and impermeable to Palestinians. For Israeli planners, 
the Green Line is invisible to the extent that planners start from the 
assumption that Israeli territories and the West Bank are one 
territorial unit. The Green Line is visible to Israeli planners to the 
extent that the distinction between Israeli territories and occupied 
territories dramatically affects the commercial value of the land, 
making settlements beyond the Green Line economically attractive 
for suburbanization.56 
 
51 SHEHADEH, supra note 19, at 81. 
52 Id. The preoccupation land regime is similar to the one in Israel before 1948. 
Compare with the development of the Israeli land regime between 1948–1966. See 
Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, The Legal Transformation of Ethnic Geography: Israeli Law 
and the Palestinian Landholder, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 923 (2001). 
53 SHEHADEH, supra note 19; see also YIFAT HOLZMAN-GAZIT, LAND EXPROPRIATION 
IN ISRAEL: LAW, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 129–49 (2007). 
54 LEIN & WEIZMAN, supra note 21, at 73–84 (Lein and Weizman give an exhaustive 
description of the incentives packages.). 
55 David Newman, The Territorial Politics of Exurbanization: Reflections on 25 years 
of Jewish Settlement in the West Bank, 3 ISR. AFF. 61, 64 (1996). 
56 Id. at 65 (David Newman described this pattern of suburbanization as “discontinued” 
wherein “the crossing of the old Green Line boundary causes a sudden discontinuity in the 
land market, characterized by an extremely sharp (rather than gradual) fall in land prices. 
The proximity of this region to the urban core, coupled with land prices and economic 
incentives usually only to be found in more remote regions resulted in this micro-region 
becoming transformed into an attractive proposition for the potential home buyer.”). 
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The combination of land transfers, regional and road plans, and 
other measures taken by the Israeli government to expropriate land in 
order to build settlement and integrate their populations in the Israeli 
polity,57 establishes the spatial ethnic duality in the West Bank and 
Gaza. In addition, it has produced in the West Bank a pattern of 
spatial organization best described by Yiftachel as “fractured 
regionalism.”58 Fractured regionalism refers to a particular mode of 
organizing territory. It describes a landscape in which territorially 
separate and unequal ethnicities are scattered in noncontiguous 
regions.59 But for Yiftachel, fractured regionalism also describes a 
particular formation of collective political identities.60 As a mode of 
organizing territory, fractured regionalism constitutes the backdrop 
against which political identities are constituted. It provides the 
background condition that determines what forms of intra-group and 
intergroup social mobilization are possible, and the nature of their 
political claims vis-à-vis the state. This political geography of the 
WBGS might help us make some general observations about the 
governance of the WBGS during the period of 1967–1993 and 
arguably during subsequent periods. 
First, most accounts of the development of the settlement activities 
in the West Bank emphasize that the fragmentation of Palestinian 
communities is, at least since the formulation of the Drobless Plan in 
1980, unique to the WBGS as occupied territories especially that, as 
such, their future status would be matter for negotiation. In fact, the 
plan itself clearly stated that: 
It is therefore significant to stress today, mainly by means of 
actions, that the autonomy does not and will not apply to the 
territories but only to the Arab population thereof. This should 
mainly find expression by establishing facts on the ground. 
Therefore, the state-owned lands and the uncultivated barren lands 
in Judea and Samaria ought to be seized right away, with the 
purpose of settling the areas between and around the centers 
occupied by the minorities so as to reduce to the minimum the 
danger of an additional Arab state being established in these 
territories. Being cut off by Jewish settlements the minority 
 
57 See EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 135–40 (1993). 
58 YIFTACHEL, supra note 32, at 111–15, 298. 
59 Id. at 112. 
60 Id.; see also Oren Yiftachel, Centralized Power and Divided Space: ‘Fractured 
Regions’ in the Israeli ‘Ethnocracy,’ 53 GEOJOURNAL 283 (2001). 
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population will find it difficult to form a territorial and political 
continuity.61 
This, however, is not entirely accurate, to the extent that it gives only 
half of the picture of the development of settlements in the WBGS in 
the period between 1967 and 1993. What fades into the background 
are the continuities with Israeli settlement activities since 1948 and 
the use of planning and housing policies as instruments for nation-
building. Yiftachel argued that in the Israeli case, nation-building was 
constituted not only through the Jewish/Arab dynamics of control and 
resistance, but also through intra-Jewish dynamics of control and 
resistance. The continuity in settlement policy and patterns strongly 
support the conclusion that the unit of analysis appropriate to 
understanding governance in the WBGS should not be constrained by 
the legal description of the WBGS as occupied territories within the 
meaning of international humanitarian law. From the perspective of 
the governing power managing the population and territory in the 
WBGS, the unit of analysis since 1967 has been the entire territory of 
mandatory Palestine. Actions and policies in the WBGS have always 
been aspects of a broader scheme to manage demographic distribution 
and territorial settlement that concern the entire territory of mandatory 
Palestine. 
Second, one important consequence of fractured regionalism in the 
WBGS and inside the Green Line was, according to Yiftachel, to 
enable a highly centralized governing regime.62 Furthermore, and in 
the context of the WBGS, fractured regionalism had, in addition to 
the dispossession and control of the Palestinians, and the preservation 
of the distribution of power between Ashkenazi, Mizrahi and other 
Jewish groups, the consequence of constituting the settlers movement 
as a political force with disproportional power in formal Israeli 
political institutions.63 
 
61 Drobless, supra note 33, at 8–10. 
62 Yiftachel, supra note 60 (Yiftachel argued that for Palestinian Arabs in Israel 
fractured regionalism encouraged the formation of regionally based political identity. As 
opposed to Palestinians in the WBGS, Palestinian Arabs in Israel identified themselves as 
a regionally based minority within an Israeli polity formulating claims that do not lead to 
political separation in an independent nation state.). See also Oren Yiftachel, Between 
Nation and State: ‘Fractured’ Regionalism Among Palestinian-Arabs in Israel, 18 POL. 
GEOGRAPHY 285 (1999). 
63 Newman, From Hitnachalut to Hitnatkut, supra note 47, at 205. (“Given the fact 
that, even at its peak, the settler population never numbered more than 0.5 percent of the 
total Israeli population, its representation in the Knesset, through different political parties, 
far exceeded its proportionality. In the Sharon Administration (2002–2006) ten members  
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b. Economic Integration 
The Israeli government took several measures that led to the 
integration of the Palestinian economy of the WBGS into the Israeli 
economy. These measures included creating a customs union, 
harmonizing taxation and wage deductions for social services,64 
introducing Israeli banking practices to the WBGS, and giving the 
Palestinian populations in the WBGS standing permission to enter 
and work in Israel with some conditions including that they were not 
allowed to stay overnight.65 The economic consequences of this 
integration translated into some improvement in the standards of 
living (compared to pre-1967), low growth rates (except for 1986, and 
1992),66 integration of the Palestinian workforce in the Israeli 
economy as low-skilled, low-wage workers, and a decline in the 
contribution of industry to the Palestinian GDP (compared to the 
beginning of the occupation).67 These results may appear 
contradictory, as low growth and higher standards of living are not 
generally correlative. Sara Roy described this characteristic path of 
economic transformation in the context of the Gaza strip as “de-
development.” In contrast to peripheral modes of development, de-
development is a process that weakens the ability of the economy to 
accumulate capital, and is not associated with the formation of 
political and economic alliances between the dominant and the 
dependent economies.68 
 
of the Knesset resided in West Bank and Gaza settlements, providing the settler movement 
with a foot hold which no other protest movement in Israel’s history had previously 
succeeded in attaining in the formal corridors of government.”). 
64 BENVENISTI, supra note 42, at 30–32. Palestinians officially employed in Israel did 
not receive the same national insurance benefits as Israeli workers. Deductions were 
designed to protect the competitiveness of the Israeli worker. The funds from the 
deductions (approx. 20% of the wage) were transferred to the Israeli treasury, and 
particularly to a deduction fund. According to Meron Benvenisti’s estimates the sum 
accrued in the fund between 1970 and 1986 amounted US$ 800 million (US$ 1 billion 
with interest). Three quarters of the fund was returned to the territory as a contribution to 
the budget of the Civilian Administration. The remainders were used for Israeli public 
consumption. 
65 BENVENISTI, supra note 57, at 127. 
66 BENVENISTI, supra note 42, at 6–10; WORLD BANK, EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO 
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 31–32 (1994). 
67 For the period until 1986, see BENVENISTI, supra note 42, at 22–23. 
68 Sara Roy, The Gaza Strip: A Case of Economic De-Development, 17 J. PALESTINE 
STUD. 56, 58 (1987). 
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c. Setting the Stage for Autonomy 
During this period, the Israeli government started to formalize a 
regulatory distinction between the civilian affairs and 
military/security affairs through the establishment of the Civil 
Administration under the authority of the military commander of the 
West Bank. Joseph Singer, head of international law branch in the 
Military Advocate General’s unit, and a key actor in the design of 
military order 947,69 presented this as routine change in the 
management in occupied territories, and as simple formalization of 
actual practice within the military government of the West Bank.70 
However, he also quoted a Ministry of Defense spokesman who said 
that the creation of the civil administration was a prelude to further 
reorganizations. Most importantly, the Civil Administration would 
gradually be taken over by civilians, and that its establishment was 
important to set the stage for a possible autonomy scheme for the 
Palestinians.71 
  
 
69 KUTTAB & SHEHADEH, supra note 20. 
70 Singer, supra note 29, at 279. 
71 Id. at 278. 
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Table 1: Three Stages of Settlement Policy in the West Bank 
Stages Settlement Policy Type of Settlement
Prime 
location for 
settlement 
Land Seizure 
Mechanism 
Involved 
Parties 
Consensus 
1967-1974 
Allon Plan Agricultural 
Cooperative 
Communities72 
East Jerusalem 
Jordan Valley 
Judean desert 
Article 52 of 
The Hague 
Regulations73 
Government 
Jewish Agency 
until 1971 
Settlement 
Department 
(World Zionist 
Organization)74 
Contestation 
1974-1977 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mainstream: 
Allon Plan 
Counterpoint: 
“Eretz Yisrael 
Ideaology” 
Agricultural 
Cooperative 
Communities 
Unauthorized 
outposts75 
East Jerusalem 
Jordan Valley 
Central 
mountain 
regions of the 
WB 
(Judea and 
Samaria) 
Article 52 of 
The Hague 
Regulation 
Declaring Miri 
and Mawat 
Land as State 
Land.76 
Government 
Settlement 
Department 
(WZO) 
Gush Emunim 
 
72 This column refers to the main types of settlement established in any one of the 
stages. Other types of settlements (e.g., industrial villages) were established during this 
period. For a breakdown of the types of settlements between 1967-1981 see Drobless, 
supra note 33, at 16–17. 
73 Article 52 of The Hague Regulations states: 
Neither requisitions in kind nor services can be demanded from communes or 
inhabitants except for the necessities of the army of occupation. They must be in 
proportion to the resources of the country, and of such a nature as not to involve the 
population in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their 
country. These requisitions and services shall only be demanded on the authority of 
the commander in the locality occupied. The contributions in kind shall, as far as 
possible, be paid for in ready money; if not, their receipt shall be acknowledged. 
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 
1803, Annex at art. 55 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. The Israeli Supreme Court sitting 
as the High Court of Justice developed a peculiar interpretation of Article 52 of The Hague 
Regulations. First, it expanded its scope to include immovable property. Second, it 
adopted a wide understanding of the test “necessities of the army of occupation” to include 
(1) what is necessary for the occupying power to fulfill its duty under Article 43 of The 
Hague Regulations “to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety,” and 
(2) the security needs of the occupying state; see David Kretzmer, The Law of Belligerent 
Occupation in the Supreme Court of Israel, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 207, 216 (2012); 
For an overview of the different position regarding the interpretation of Article 52, see 
YUTKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND ITS INTERACTION WITH INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 217–38 (2009). 
74 LEIN & WEIZMAN, supra note 21, at 21. 
75 Nir Shalev, The Ofra Settlement: An Unauthorized Outpost, B’TSELEM (Dec. 2008), 
http://www.btselem.org/download/200812_ofra_eng.pdf. 
76 Miri and Mawat are types of land regimes under Ottoman Land Law (1858); see 
SHEHADEH, supra note 31, at 14–30; Kedar, supra note 52. The strategy of declaring Miri 
and Mawat land state land is not necessarily consistent with customary international law 
and The Hague Regulations.  Article 55 of The Hague Regulations states: “The occupying 
State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real 
property, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the  
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Stages Settlement Policy Type of Settlement
Prime 
location for 
settlement 
Land Seizure 
Mechanism 
Involved 
Parties 
Contestation 
1974-1977 
(continued) 
Settlers taking 
de facto 
possession of 
the land 
Consensus 
1977-1993 
Drobles and 
Sharon plans 
Erestz Yisrael 
ideology 
Residential 
Communities 
Unauthorized 
outposts 
East Jerusalem 
Central 
mountain 
regions of the 
WB 
(Judea and 
Samaria) 
Declaring Miri 
and Mewat 
Land as State 
Land. 
Settlers taking 
de facto 
possession of 
the land 
Government 
Settlement 
Department 
(WZO) 
Gush Emunim 
then offshoot 
movements 
(e.g., Amana) 
2. Contraction and Fragmentation: The Oslo Years (1994–2000) 
The post Oslo regime followed the trends of the previous period. 
Three specific transformations are important for the purpose of this 
paper. 
a. Transfer of Authority 
The authorities of the Civil Administration were transferred 
gradually to the institutions of the Palestinian authority. The 
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government Arrangements 
(13 September 1993) established the principle restated in all 
subsequent agreements, according to which upon entry of force of the 
declaration, “a transfer of authority from the Israeli military 
government and its Civil Administration” to the Palestinian 
Council/Palestinian Authority will commence.”77 It also established 
the principle that these transfers of powers will not derogate from 
Israel’s overall security and military control. Article VIII of the 
Declaration of Principles reads: 
In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the 
Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will 
establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry 
the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as 
 
occupied country. It must protect the capital of these properties, and administer them in 
accordance with the rules of usufruct.” Hague Regulations, supra note 73, art. 55. At the 
same time, declaring Miri land as state land simply makes the complaint against land 
seizures order inadmissible before the High Court because a private plaintiff would not 
have a legal standing to contest the order. See LEIN & WEIZMAN, supra note 21, at 51. 
77 GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS 318 (2000). 
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the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of 
safeguarding their internal security and public order.78 
These principles effectively translated into the dissolution of the 
Israeli Civil Administration and the transfer of its authorities to the 
Palestinian Council. The agreements also specified that the budget 
and accounts of the Civil Administration would be transferred to the 
institutions of Palestinian Authority (PA) as soon as the PA 
establishes its revenue collection system. The PA assumed the 
responsibility for above budget expenditure and in case of shortfall in 
tax collection. 
In tandem with transfer for some governmental authorities from the 
Israeli Civil Administration to the Palestinian Authority, this period 
witnessed the qualitative increase in the role of donors in the 
governance of the West Bank. During the period from 1967–1994, 
there were multiple donors providing assistance to the Palestinians 
consisting of states, voluntary private initiatives, various international 
organizations, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees. Donors acted individually, without any 
systematic coordination. The choice of what projects to fund was 
partly determined by the donor’s political interests and partly by the 
limits put in place by Israel. Donors had no influence on setting 
policy objectives or defining priorities for projects directed to the 
Palestinians, and they needed permission of the military government 
in the WBGS before starting any projects. Permits were rarely granted 
to productive projects. Instead, permits were granted to projects that 
could reduce the budgetary burden of the Israeli government 
(charitable projects, consumption-oriented projects).79 Aid through 
multilateral agencies was limited to those affiliated with the United 
Nations.80 
After 1994, the institutional framework for channeling aid to the 
WBGS was constitutive of the Oslo process. The expansion of aid 
programs from US $200 million per year before Oslo, to nearly four 
times that amount immediately after, meant that donors needed to set 
up a network of institutions and decision making bodies to identify 
new projects, set-up priorities, channel funds and monitor project 
implementation. Donors coordinated their activities on all levels 
 
78 Id. at 319. 
79 Jabr, supra note 41, at 392. 
80 MERON BENVENISTI, JUDEA-SAMARIA AND GAZA DISTRICT: A SIXTEEN-YEAR 
SURVEY (1967–1983) 63 (1983). 
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within the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) at the highest level 
composed of key political donors. On the operational level, various 
coordination committees were put in place: the Joint Liaison 
Committee (JLC) (PA, Israel, and local representatives of major 
donors), and the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC) (PA and 
local donors representatives). For very specific implementation and 
coordination on the project level, two more committees were set up 
mirroring the JLC and LACC: Task force on Project Implementation, 
and Sector-specific Working Groups.81 
The World Bank played a “central” role in the assistance process.82 
The World Bank facilitated the meeting between different donors, 
helped track donor assistance, and played a major role in assessing 
economic conditions and developing packages for projects for donor 
support. Finally, during the Oslo years, the World Bank was 
responsible for managing special funds to support the nascent 
Palestinian technical and administrative infrastructures and to support 
the start-up and the recurrent costs of the PA.83 The channeling of aid 
was predominantly through the institutions of the PA.84 
b. From an Occupation Regime of Separate and Unequal to an 
Internationally Recognized Regime of Autonomy 
The Oslo Accords formalized the territorial and ethnic distinctions 
not as the acts of a military occupier, but as an internationally 
recognized framework to govern the WBGS. The territorial division 
of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into three different areas (A, B, 
C), although conceived as interim, became the stable background 
condition for all subsequent developments and redeployments. To 
recall, areas A and B included the major Palestinian urban centers. In 
A and B, the Palestinian Council enjoys “all civilian powers and 
 
81 ANNE LE MORE, INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PALESTINIANS AFTER OSLO: 
POLITICAL GUILT, WASTED MONEY 181 (2008). 
82 WORLD BANK, supra note 66; Rex Brynen, International Aid to the West Bank and 
Gaza: A Primer, 25 J. PALESTINE STUD. 46, 51 (1996). 
83 Id. 
84 In the period from 1994–1997, 64% of donor assistance took the form of budget 
support to the PA. These included start-up costs for emergency employment projects 
necessitated by the total or partial closure of the WBGS. See United Nations Special 
Coordinator in the Occupied Territories (UNSCO), Report on the Palestinian Economy, 
Special Focus: Donor Disbursements and Public Investments (Jan. 27, 1999), 
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/962cf87f47b9ad2f
85256873005c8e21?OpenDocument. 
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responsibilities including planning and zoning.”85 In addition, the 
Palestinian Council enjoys the authority to maintain security among 
Palestinians. Israel retained residual security powers and military 
control over the WBGS. That is, these redeployments and re-
allocation of governmental powers could be overridden by Israel’s 
power to address “external threats” and to protect Israelis and 
“confront the threat of terrorism.”86 In addition, Israel has retained the 
authority to maintain security among Israelis and between Israelis and 
Palestinians. Area C was defined broadly as any territory that is not 
specifically designated as A or B. Israel retained full territorial 
jurisdiction over area C. Spatially, this makes the distribution of 
powers between Israel and the Palestinian Council in area C the 
default in WBGS. It includes, in addition to the settlements, the 
spaces between areas A and B, something like the cosmic dark matter 
that fill-in the spatial fabric of the WBGS. Some estimated that area C 
represented approximately 70% of the WBGS.87 Although the 
agreements provided for an eventual redeployment from area C so 
that those territories could eventually become categorized as either 
areas A or B, such redeployments did not take place. One of the most 
important principles in the redeployments applicable to all different 
categories of territories was that the transfer of functional 
jurisdictions to the Palestinian Council in areas A and B in no way 
applied to Israeli citizens residents in the WBGS.88 
The distinction between areas A, B, and C made possible the 
establishment of a regime governing the movement of people inside 
the WBGS and the flow of goods and services in and out of the 
WBGS. The Oslo Accords enabled the Israeli authorities to control 
movement of Palestinians inside the West Bank between areas A and 
B, and area C. This translated into a network of checkpoints, 
roadblocks, and a permit system that henceforward would regulate 
movement of Palestinians inside the WBGS.89 The regime effectively 
classified roads inside the West Bank (all roads in the WBGS are 
most likely to pass through area C) on the basis of whether or not 
Palestinians were allowed to circulate. Some roads become 
 
85 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Isr.-P.L.O., art. XI(2)(b), 
Sept. 28, 1995, in WATSON, supra note 77, art. XI(2)(b), at 355. 
86 Id. at 357 (regarding art. XIII(2)(a)). 
87 Id. at 110; SHEHADEH, supra note 19, at 37. 
88 Interim Agreement, supra note 85, at 360 (regarding art. XVII(2)(c)). 
89 Fobidden Roads: Israel’s Discriminatory Road Regime in the West Bank, B’TSELEM 
(Aug. 2004), http://www.btselem.org/download/200408_forbidden_roads_eng.pdf. 
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completely prohibited to Palestinian (vehicles and persons) 
circulation,90 others partially so, and the rest merely restricted.91 Most 
importantly, this complex of checkpoints, roadblocks, and permit 
system gave the Government of Israel the possibility to enforce an 
internal closure in the West Bank. Usually ordered in response to a 
Palestinian attack in Israel, internal closure consists of stopping, for 
Palestinians, all movement between Areas A, B, and C. According to 
Amnesty International’s statistics the first internal closure was 
ordered in 1996 for twenty-one days in response to a suicide attack in 
Israel resulting in more than fifty deaths. In 1997 and 1998 there were 
a total of twenty-seven deaths and forty days of total or partial 
closures in the West Bank.92 The legal correlative for a system of 
movement restriction for Palestinians is a system of freedom of 
movement for the settlers and Israelis inside the WBGS and also 
across the Green Line. 
Land expropriation changed in character in that it was conducted in 
a piecemeal fashion often on a neighborhood level allowing the 
continuing growth of settlements particularly in the Jerusalem area.93 
The Israeli government justified the expropriations in West Bank to 
develop the bypass roads with military necessity.94 
c. Economic Disengagement 
The Oslo economic regime reversed the previous periods’ trend 
toward economic integration in two specific aspects. The transfer of 
civil responsibilities to the Palestinian Council implied the transfer of 
many regulatory functions that could affect the economy. In addition 
to budgetary separation, the Palestinian Council had some authority in 
setting trade policy, customs rates for some products and the power to 
set the level of taxation including the value added tax within a 
specified range (15%–16%). Labor movement on the other hand 
became significantly more difficult. Palestinian residents in the 
 
90 Id. at 14 (Table 1: Completely Prohibited Roads). 
91 Id. at 12–19. 
92 Israel and the Occupied Territories, Surviving Under Siege: The Impact of 
Movement Restrictions on the Right to Work, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 14 (Sept. 2003), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde15/001/2003/en/. 
93 Eitan Felner, A Policy of Discrimination: Land Expropriation, Planning and 
Building, B’TSELEM, (May 1995), http://www.btselem.org/publications/summaries/199 
505_policy_of_discrimination. 
94 Shah, supra note 27, at p. 223; B’Tselem, supra note 89, at pp. 6–7; LEIN & 
WEIZMAN, supra note 21, at p. 50. 
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WBGS no longer had a general permit to enter Israel. Furthermore, 
beginning in 1993, the Israeli government frequently resorted to a 
closure policy. The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator 
for the Middle East Peace Process estimated that between 1994 and 
1999 Israel imposed a total of 443 days of comprehensive closure on 
the WBGS.95 During comprehensive closures, movement of goods 
and people in and out of the WBGS and between the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip becomes severely restricted.96 At the same time, the 
economic protocol annexed to the Israel-Palestine Interim Agreement 
on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (September 1995), in 
combination with the control over external borders as per the security 
arrangement, entrenched the role of Israel the biggest trading partner 
rendering the West Bank and the Gaza Strip individually dependent 
on the Israeli economy.97 
3. Disengagement (2000–2010) 
The policy of disengagement consists of a unilateral decision by 
the Israeli government to redeploy its troops, settlements and 
economic activities outside a unilaterally chosen perimeter, thereby 
minimizing the point of friction between the Israeli army and citizens 
and the Palestinians, while a the same time maintaining the ability to 
control access to this perimeter and to project military power when 
needed. Disengagement was introduced both in Gaza and the West 
Bank. In the 2004 Gaza disengagement plan, Israel decided to 
withdraw its civilian settlements, economic and military installations 
outside the perimeter of the Gaza strip with the exception of the 
borders with Egypt.98 Israel retained control over the borders, sea 
access, and airspace. The plan also included withdrawal from selected 
 
95 United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories (UNSCO), Report on 
the Palestinian Economy (June 30, 2001), http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0 /F25244 
DC8C25B79485256B1A006D9CD1 (last visited June 13, 2013); see also Radwan A. 
Shaban, The Harsh Reality of Closure, in DEVELOPMENT UNDER ADVERSITY: THE 
PALESTINE ECONOMY IN TRANSITION 45 (Ishac Diwan & Radwan Shaban eds., 1999); 
LEILA FARSAKH, PALESTINIAN LABOUR MIGRATION TO ISRAEL: LABOUR, LAND AND 
OCCUPATION (2005). 
96 Yehezkel Lein, Civilians Under Siege: Restrictions on freedom of Movement as 
Collective Punishment, B’TSELEM (Jan. 2001), http://www.btselem.org/press_releases 
/20010111. 
97 Sara Roy, The Palestinian Economy and the Oslo Process: Decline and 
Fragmentation, 24 THE EMIRATES OCCASIONAL PAPERS 1 (1998). 
98 Gaza Disengagement Plan, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Aug. 15, 2005), 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/Israeli%20Disengagement%20 
Plan%2020-Jan-2005.aspx. 
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settlements and military sites in the northern part of the West Bank. 
The same modus operandi underlies, albeit on a much larger scale, the 
decision to build the separation barrier. 
Disengagement institutionalizes the policy of closure that became 
routine during the Oslo years, especially after the outbreak of the 
Second Intifada. As such, it is not a reversal of the Oslo Accords, but 
the deployment of many aspects of its regime. Put differently, the 
disengagement would be inconceivable without the institutional 
rearrangements contained in the Oslo Accords. This policy sometimes 
involved making territorial concessions. For the first time in the 
history of the settlement movement since 1948, the government 
decided to willingly evacuate and demolish civilian settlements.99 It 
also involves territorial gains. The routing of the Separation Barrier 
allowed Israel to annex 16.6% of the West Bank, composed of lands 
between the barrier and the 1949 armistice line containing 80% of the 
settlements’ population in the West Bank.100 The territorial 
implications of disengagement as a policy, however, were not merely 
about gaining square kilometers. The policy of disengagement 
introduced a territorial regime that was in many aspects the opposite 
of “fractured regionalism.” Fractured regionalism, although it 
interrupted the territorial continuity of areas populated by the 
Palestinians, did presume, and in fact required, the presence of a 
certain level of routinized interaction with the settlement, and the 
centralized authority of the military government with its role in 
channeling resources to fund public services. Disengagement 
interrupted Palestinian regional continuity without interaction with 
settlement, and no civilian responsibilities on the part of the Israeli 
army. 
During this period, the normalization of closures as disengagement 
exacerbated the donor community’s confusion, inherent in the Oslo 
accords, regarding the scope and allocation of legal responsibilities 
between the PA and Israel over the different aspects of the lives of 
Palestinian civilians. The Oslo Accords, particularly because of their 
interim nature, were subject of an intense legal controversy.101 The 
 
99 Yiftachel, supra note 18. 
100 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 1, at 38, 51 (July 9). 
101 Eyal Benvenisti, Responsibility for the Protection of Human Rights Under the 
Interim Israeli-Palestinian Agreements, 28 ISR. L. REV. 297 (1994); Omar M. Dajani, 
Stalled Between Seasons: The International Legal Status of Palestine During the Interim  
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legal issue was to determine to what extent the signing of the interim 
accords and the creation of a Palestinian authority altered the scope of 
Israel’s legal responsibilities, as the occupying power, over the 
Palestinian civilian populations of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
The controversy, although was never conclusively resolved, remained 
dormant during the years of Oslo. It simply did not have any 
significant impact on the channeling of donor assistance, during times 
of generalized optimism about the prospects of peace, and a political 
determination to build a peace at any cost. 
With the outbreak of the Second Intifada the dormant controversy 
started to produce its delayed effects. From the perspective of the 
donors, the situation in the WBGS confronted them with a sense of an 
irresolvable dilemma. The dilemma stems from the realization that the 
necessary cost of responding to the dire needs of the civilian 
populations is to relieve Israel from its responsibilities as an occupier 
under international humanitarian and human rights law. At the same 
time, insisting that Israel, as an occupying power, should bear the 
primary responsibility to minimize the impact of its policies and 
security measures in the West Bank and Gaza will have a necessary 
cost depriving civilians from desperately needed aid.102 
During this period, Israel withdrew from many of the coordination 
committees both on the capital and local levels. Coordination took 
place in donors only committees. With frequent military operations, 
and the decline in the tax revenues, aid became the major source of 
funding for the PA budget. This role of donors, as responsible by 
default, was brought to the foreground with the announcement of the 
 
Period, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 27 (1997); Dinstein, Y., The International Legal 
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102 In November 2003, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
announced that it would not extend two economic security programs it had started in the 
middle of 2002 in the West Bank. The two programs benefited approximately 500,000 
Palestinians. As a justification for this decision the ICRC emphasized that these two 
programs were temporary measures designed to help “vulnerable residents of the West 
Bank to overcome the hardships of the particularly acute emergency situation that 
prevailed following Israel’s military redeployment in the territory in April 2002.” 
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but poignantly stated in a language that should not be read as formulaic: “However, the 
ICRC stressed that Israel bore the primary responsibility for the welfare of the Palestinian 
population living under its occupation and that the ICRC would not relieve Israel of its 
obligations in this regard.” International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], Annual 
Report 2003 270 (2003). See also Cameron W. Barr, Aid Gets Political for Red Cross, 
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Disengagement Plan. The Israeli government in fact proposed at an 
early stage of the discussions surrounding the plan, that certain 
assistance agencies (the World Bank) should take control of the 
evacuated settlements and industrial estates. With disengagement, 
bilateral and multilateral donors, humanitarian and development 
agencies, and NGOs in the West Bank, especially with disintegration 
of the authority exercised effectively by the PA because of the 
combined effect of Israeli closures and military operations, and the 
political confrontation with Hamas, have become de facto rulers. 
II 
UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE IN THE WBGS 
This paper is concerned with understanding systems of social 
control and the role that legal regimes play in constituting them. The 
approach I tease out in this paper fundamentally questions a basic 
assumption in the disciplines of international law, international 
human rights law, and international humanitarian law about the 
relationship between law, power, and systems of social control. Stated 
simplistically, according to this basic assumption, rooted in liberal 
political philosophy, modern legal regimes of international law 
provide the framework for speaking truth to power. In contrast, I 
pursue an account of legal regimes as constitutive of systems of social 
control. In such an account, a legal strategy for resisting systems of 
social control is akin to understanding the rules of a computer system 
before hacking it. 
In Part II, I have developed a descriptive account of one such 
system of social control, namely that of Israel in relationship to the 
Palestinians in the WBGS. This system has the following three 
characteristic features: 
 The government of Israel maintains a strategic control over the 
territories and Palestinian populations of the WBGS with the 
ability to project military power at will. In international law such 
level of control satisfies the legally accepted definition of 
effective control;103 
 In the territories under its effective control, the government of 
Israel has set up a dual governance regime that distinguish 
 
103 United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, “Trial of Wilhelm List and Others (The 
Hostages Trial), Case No. 47, Judgment of 19 February 1947, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS 
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between Palestinian-Arab persons and places and Israeli-Jewish 
persons and places; and 
 The government of Israel has abdicated any responsibility over 
civilian affairs of the Palestinian Arabs in the WBGS. Jewish 
residents are Israeli citizens, and Jewish places are effectively 
integrated in the Israeli legal system, administration, and 
economy. International donors and humanitarian agencies are by 
default responsible for the welfare the Palestinians in the WBGS. 
International lawyers’ understanding of governance in the WBGS 
has always been mediated by international humanitarian law. Legal 
debates about the status of the WBGS focus on applicability of the 
law of occupation and the consequences of such applicability in terms 
of rights, privileges and duties of occupying power vis-à-vis protected 
persons under its effective control. Since the occupation of the 
WBGS, the applicability debates have gone through two distinct 
phases. In the first phase from 1967 to 1994, there was a consensus 
among all interested parties that the WBGS were occupied territories. 
There was disagreement, however, on the body of rules applicable to 
these occupied territories (The Hague Regulations vs. Fourth Geneva 
Convention).104 In a second phase from 1994 to 2013, the occupied 
status of the WBGS in itself became the focus of the disagreement.105 
In this section, I would like to bracket the applicability debate, 
fueled especially after the Gaza Disengagement Plan.106 There might 
have been compelling policy reasons, and short-term advantages for 
the government of Israel, the Palestinian resistance movement 
including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), third parties 
with interest in the political future, and humanitarian welfare of the 
Palestinians in the WBGS, or in global collective security to start 
from a working hypothesis that the legal regime of occupation is 
applicable on the WBGS.107 But there is a point when the working 
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107 Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories 
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112 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL REVIEW [Vol. 16, 79 
 
hypothesis becomes obsolete. This is the situation when our 
commitment as international lawyers to the framework of the law of 
occupation i) can no longer describe the actual regime governing the 
WBGS; ii) produces absurd outcome and entangles us in irresolvable 
dilemmas.108 
Consider in the context of this paper the governance regime of the 
WBGS after the outbreak of the Second Intifada, and specifically the 
responsibilities of humanitarian agencies. The November 2003 
decision of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to 
end the food distribution programs in the West Bank because it did 
not want to relieve Israel from its responsibilities as an occupying 
power is precisely the type of situation in which a commitment to a 
working hypothesis has produced absurd outcomes and entangled us 
in irresolvable dilemmas.109 This perception of irresolvable dilemma 
stems from a realization that the necessary cost of responding to the 
dire needs of the civilian populations is to relieve Israel from its 
responsibilities as an occupier under International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law. At the same time, insisting that Israel, as an 
occupying power, should bear the primary responsibility to minimize 
the impact of its policies and security measures in the West Bank and 
Gaza will have as a necessary cost depriving civilians from 
desperately needed aid. More specifically, the dilemma is experienced 
by aid workers because they confront a situation that requires a choice 
between two courses of action that conflict with an axiomatic aspect 
of their shared understanding of their role, the modus operandi of “do 
no harm.”110 Dilemmas of this sort are often the effects of 
unacknowledged constraints. The experienced necessity to make the 
impossible choice between on the one hand depriving vulnerable 
civilian populations from assistance; and on the other, subsidizing the 
power structure that produced the vulnerability does not occur in a 
vacuum. It is embedded in a legal/institutional context that defined 
the field of available alternatives. 
This legal/institutional context constrains choice in at least two 
ways. First, there are constraints that result from path dependency. 
 
108 This is not a novel argument in the history of legal thought. See Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897); Felix S. Cohen, 
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COL. L. REV. 809 (1935); Alf 
Ross, Tû-Tû, 70 HARV. L. REV. 812 (1957). 
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They bring to the foreground the fundamental question of “How did 
we get here?” What are the past choices that shaped the 
legal/institutional context of aid in the West Bank and Gaza in such a 
way that an actor like the ICRC has to choose between depriving 
civilians from assistance and subsidizing the occupation? Second, 
there are constraints that result from the internalization of false 
necessities. 
In this section, I first argue that, descriptively, governance in the 
WBGS as it is actually exercised (as opposed to how it ought to be 
exercised) at least since September 2000 no longer fits the legal 
template of a belligerent occupation. Second, I argue that a realistic 
understanding of governance in the WBGS should not focus on the 
unique status of the WBGS as occupied territories but on the 
structural connection between WBGS and the state of Israel. In other 
words, understanding governance in the WBGS should treat Israel 
and the WBGS as part of one political/economic reality. This 
essentially means, as articulated by Oren Yiftachel, that “events and 
processes taking place in most parts of Israel/Palestine are 
interlinked.”111 Occupier and occupied are “enveloped” through a 
process of mutually dependent development.112 
A. Occupation as a Fact and Occupation as a Regime 
1. What Is Occupation? 
Occupation is a legal regime. In a Westphalian world of sovereign 
nation-states, the legal regime of occupation regulates one, not 
infrequent, consequence of war: the effective exercise of power by 
one state over the territory of another. Occupation is temporary. It is 
an interim governance regime that lasts for the duration of the 
underlying hostilities, or of the effective control of the occupying 
forces. As such, it is the public law of occupied territories. It 
comprises rules that regulate the relationship between the occupying 
power and the civilian populations in occupied territories. It also 
regulates certain aspects of the activities of third countries, 
international organizations and NGOs in occupied territories, 
particularly with regard to the channeling of humanitarian assistance. 
Governing occupied territories is not qualitatively different from 
the exercise of normal governmental powers. From the perspective of 
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the civilian populations in occupied territories, the jurisdictional 
affiliation of public authority matters for reasons that are exogenous 
to the occupation (e.g., nationalism).113 Whatever differences that may 
exist between governing as a sovereign and as an occupier ultimately 
flow from the role of the occupation regime in the larger system of 
interstate relations. 
The modern regime of occupation was carved out by lawyers, army 
generals, and diplomats working out the details of the European state 
system after the Napoleonic wars, and more specifically, after the 
Franco-Prussian war of 1871.114 Although the immediate context of 
these debates was the legality of the acts of specific occupiers (e.g., 
Prussian army in the Alsace-Lorraine, or those of the Russian army in 
Bulgaria (1877–1878)), the stakes extended beyond the narrow 
partisan interests fueling these controversies. In the process, the 
modern regime of occupation was slowly differentiated from the older 
regime of conquest that enabled the unilateral assumption of 
sovereignty over territories acquired as a result of military action. 
This differentiation can be best understood as one instance in which 
diplomats, lawyers, and army generals were mediating between the 
conflicting political ideals (republicanism vs. old regime, nationalism 
vs. dynastic absolutism) and economic forces (nobility vs. 
bourgeoisie) that swept the continent during the nineteenth century. 
This meant that the modern occupation regime was instrumental in 
conserving the European status quo,115 and, at the same time, in 
 
113 In international law disputes over territorial sovereignty, the attitude of the 
population towards the state exercising governmental authority may be relevant to 
establish the effectiveness of possession in cases of adverse possession. See MARCELO G. 
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Vienna compromise did not embody an idealist fantasy of a perpetual peace. In effect, it 
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power. (See Bhuta, supra note 114, at 732.) Towards the end of the nineteenth century the 
Vienna order came under considerable stress. The emergence of new powers on the  
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giving legal/institutional expression to the growing political power of 
nationalist movements and the bourgeoisie. More specifically, the 
regime of non-interference with private property in occupied 
territories, a core element of nineteenth law,116 was a central element 
in preserving the territorial and political status quo in a continent 
haunted by the possibility of revolutionary wars. What distinguished 
the occupier from the ‘legitimate’ sovereign was precisely its inability 
to change the constitutional order of the occupied territory. More 
specifically, what distinguished the occupier from the legitimate 
sovereign is its inability to change the regime of private property and 
the system of privileges associated with it including the authority to 
levy taxes and to decide on the level of public spending in occupied 
territories.117 
At the same time, this same regime for enemy property was a 
manifestation of the rising power of the bourgeoisie and their strong 
interest in preserving the flow of commerce even in times of war.118 
 
European scene (some of which were outside Europe, e.g., the United States and Japan), 
and the rising challenges of nationalism to the territorial status quo meant that diplomats 
and rulers could no longer assume that they are operating in a system stabilized by a 
balance of powers. The threat of war and the equilibrium of forces could no longer act as 
stabilizing factors. In such context, a system in which the ground rules legitimates the 
acquisition of sovereign title over land occupied in the course of military action is no less 
than a ticking bomb. This made it easier for the formation of general consensus on the 
inadmissibility of conquest in a European context, and on a new interim regime to govern 
occupied territories that limits the authority of the occupier in the interest of the ousted 
sovereign. This consensus was eventually articulated in The Hague Regulations (1899, 
1907) in particular the famous Article 43. See Hague Regulations, supra note 73, at art. 43. 
The delinking of public authority from sovereign title, the central analytical divide at the 
heart of the regime of occupation, was in effect a delinking of war from political 
legitimacy, and of territorial change from regime change. The modern regime of 
occupation reproduced the logic of the Vienna settlement, in that it removed from the 
international plane the fundamental political conflict about political legitimacy. 
116 ERNST H. FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW OF BELLIGERENT 
OCCUPATION 9 (1942). 
117 Hague Regulations, supra note 73, art. 46, 48, and 55. 
118 Institutional economist Karl Polanyi argued, convincingly, that the balance of power 
system couldn’t explain on its own the persistence of relative stability in the continent for 
a hundred years (1815–1914). He insisted on the importance of the historical victory of the 
bourgeoisie and its ideals on how to organize the economy, in directing the plays of wars 
and alliances to favor general stability in the continent. To illustrate this proposition, 
Polanyi referred to the observed changes in international law specifically with respect to 
the treatment of enemy property, and the fate of commercial relations in times of war. See 
KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 17–18 (2001). Against this background, the law of occupation 
codified in The Hague Regulations of 1899, appears mainly as a regime to manage the 
problem of enemy property in occupied territories. Feilchenfeld noted in retrospect that 
“The Hague Regulations were a late codification of a body of law adopted in an  
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However, as noted by Schmitt, the continuing success of this 
mediation, seemed to depend on the presence of a common 
constitutional conception of the state—specifically the Liberal 
(capital L) centralized state with its order based on the distinction 
between public and private, state and civil society and markets. This 
excluded the colonial wars between European countries from the 
applicability of the legal regime of occupation. 
By the time Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 
1967, the international law of occupation had undergone important 
transformations. Most importantly, the changing nature of warfare, 
the emergence and development of international mechanisms for the 
protection of human rights, and the consolidation of an international 
norm protecting self-determination for territories under colonial rule, 
racial domination and foreign subjugation and exploitation, have 
transformed the regime of occupation in two distinct and related 
directions. On the one hand, and contrary to nineteenth century law 
that recognized the conflict between the occupier and ousted 
sovereign, the post-World War II conception of occupation presumed 
a fundamental conflict of interests between occupiers and the civilian 
populations of the occupied territories.119 An occupier can no longer 
 
atmosphere of nineteenth century liberalism, shaped by the basic philosophy of that era, 
and drafted for the conditions of a nineteenth-century liberal world.” He also commented 
that the balance struck in The Hague Regulations between minimizing the effects of war 
on civilians, the sacredness of property and the protection of military interests assumed 
that “occupants would deal with economic laissez-faire structures and that, consequently, 
sufficient protection was afforded by restricting occupants to military and police powers 
and regulating interference with property.” See FEILCHENFELD, supra note 116 at 12, 17. 
Feilchenfeld’s claim seems plausible but, in the context of the present paper, it should not 
be taken literally. The Hague Regulations have limited the privileges of occupiers to take 
the private property of civilians in occupied territories to situations in which military 
necessity or the needs of the army of occupation require such takings. This still left a 
rather wide margin of discretion to occupying armies to restrict the flow of commerce and 
industry. In fact, accounts about the status of private property in occupied territories in the 
major wars between 1863 and 1914, are filled with instances of pillage, and destruction of 
private property. See DORIS APPEL GARBER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF 
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION (1863–1914): A HISTORICAL SURVEY 280–86 (1949). Still 
The Hague Regulations and earlier attempts to articulate the specifics of the regime of 
occupation represent the record of deliberations between rulers. As such they provide an 
articulation of a shared conceptual framework containing their most elementary 
understanding of the institutional arrangement that governed their world. In this context, 
Polanyi’s claim was about giving a sociological/economic base for these conceptual 
frameworks. The question underlying his account was about identifying the class 
perspective from which the most important problem that arises in the management of the 
consequences of war was the protection of private property from political interference. 
119 EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 29–31 (1993). 
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be presumed an “impartial trustee of the ousted sovereign or the local 
population.”120 On the other hand, the legal regime of occupation was 
humanized121 to the extent that it addressed individuals directly (and 
not as subjects of the ousted sovereign) and grounded the guarantees 
of the law of occupation in respect for fundamental human rights.122 
2. Occupation and the Duty to Govern 
The legal controversy about the status of Gaza after disengagement 
has been presented as a debate about a question of fact; namely 
whether the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has effective control. 
Article 42 of The Hague Regulations (1899) provides the legal test 
for what constitutes effective control. International lawyers have 
repeatedly noted the remarkable ambiguity of its text. But there seems 
to be a consensus among state actors supported by national and 
international case law that the measure of effectiveness is a potential 
exercise of control. It is irrelevant for the purposes of determining the 
occupied status of a territory whether the occupying force has in fact 
“[taken] all the measures in [its] power to restore and ensure, as far as 
possible, public order and safety”123 in the occupied territories. In 
other words, the responsibilities of occupiers vis-à-vis occupied 
population are not constitutive of occupation but a legal consequence 
of it. As noted by Yuval Shany, there are good policy reasons to 
support this understanding of effective control: 
 [. . .] by de-linking the existence of occupation from the actual 
exercise of governmental authority by the military power vis-à-vis 
the local population, this approach discourages the occupier from 
 
120 Id. at 30. For a reconstruction of occupation law that transforms it from a legal 
regime to protect the ousted sovereign to one that protects the right to self-determination 
see Alain Pellet, The Destruction of Troy will not Take Place, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: TWO DECADES OF ISRAELI 
OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP 169 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992). 
121 Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239 
(2000). 
122 Respect for and Implementation of Human Rights in Occupied Territories, G.A. 
Res. 2443 (XXIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2443(XXIII) (Dec. 19, 1968); Respect for Human 
Rights in Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII) (Dec. 19, 1968); United Nations, 
Report of the Secretary General, Respect of Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, UN Doc. 
No. A/7220 (1969); U.N. Secretary-General, Respect for Human Rights in Armed 
Conflicts, U.N. Doc. A /8052 (Sept. 18, 1970). See also John Quigley, The Relation 
Between Human Rights Law and the Law of Belligerent Occupation: Does an Occupied 
Population Have a Right to Freedom of Assembly and Expression, 12 B.C. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 1 (1989). 
123 Hague Regulations, supra note 73, at art. 43. 
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shirking its obligation to govern the occupied territory. Arguably, 
the opposite test, which examines actual displays of authority, 
might encourage occupiers to refrain from maintaining law and 
order and providing governmental service in the occupied territory 
in order to evade assuming the duties introduced by the laws of 
belligerent occupation. This would leave the local population bereft 
of any governmental protection (as its own government is incapable 
of governing the area and the invader is unwilling to do so).124 
The underlying assumption of this policy justification for the criterion 
of effective control is fairly close to the surface. The modern legal 
regime for governing occupied territories is embedded in a global 
institutional arrangement linking political order, territoriality,125 and 
monopoly of violence (the Westphalian state system). This 
arrangement is conceptually rooted in theories of social contract in 
which the fundamental political bargain is one of obedience in 
exchange for social peace. In other words, governance is constituted 
by the physical facts of territorial control and the ability to effectively 
solve coordination problems for the community. Arguably, in the 
framework of a Liberal political philosophy, this fundamental bargain 
can be articulated in terms of a duty to govern. This duty can be 
justified on moral grounds: if you are effective in realizing a morally 
necessary task, you have a duty to do so. But it could also be justified 
on grounds of social utility. 
In this basic Westphalian schema, the regime of occupation is 
somewhat of an anomaly in that it governs the situation in which a 
governing authority enjoys a monopoly of violence but without the 
presumption of a social contract. This explains in part the theoretical 
and doctrinal difficulties surrounding the applicability of human 
rights norms in occupied territories.126 And as an anomaly, the regime 
of occupation is interesting from a political theory perspective 
precisely because it brings to the foreground the fundamental 
assumptions implied in the Westphalian frame. Occupied are not 
citizens, and the acts of occupiers are not expressions of a general 
will. The law of occupation is an interim arrangement; it is the public 
law of citizens without a public. The duty to govern is an irreducible 
aspect of this regime as articulated in Article 43 of The Hague 
 
124 Shany, supra note 106, at 376. 
125 Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843 
(1999), at 866–97. 
126 On the conceptual challenges raised at the intersection of Laws of War and 
International Human Rights Law, see Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela, Humanitarian Law 
and Human Rights Law: The Politics of Distinction, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 299 (2013). 
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Regulations:“The authority of the legitimate power having actually 
passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in 
his power to re-establish and insure, as far as possible, public order 
and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in 
force in the country.”127 
Although the normative bite of Article 43 has significantly 
declined during the twentieth century, in that it fails on its own to 
provide any clear instructions to occupants on how to govern, it 
remains the “cornerstone of the law of occupation.”128 Later 
elaborations and interpretations of Article 43, expanded and 
contracted the power of the occupier “to reestablish and insure, as far 
as possible, public order and safety.” But none of these legal 
developments questioned the basic structure of Article 43 and the link 
between effective military control and a duty to govern. 
The situation in Gaza, and increasingly so in the WB, however, is 
unique. The Government of Israel’s control over the WBGS does 
satisfy the “effective control” test. The steps taken by the Government 
of Israel to maintain effective control and to transfer responsibility 
over the welfare of the Palestinians to authority buffers such as the 
PA, bilateral and multilateral donors, and international humanitarian 
and development assistance agencies did take place gradually, 
deliberately, and with the recognition and support of relevant 
international actors in the context of a peace process. The separation 
between effective control and governance responsibility is a defining 
feature of the legal regime actually governing the WBGS. Put 
differently, and to the extent that the duty to govern is an irreducible 
element of the occupation regime, Israel currently controls but does 
not “occupy” the WBGS. 
B. The Law of Occupation in the OPT 
The applicability of the international law of occupation has been 
contested in different ways by the different parties to the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict. 
Since the beginning of the occupation,129 the official position of the 
Israeli government was that the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative 
 
127 Hague Regulations, supra note 73, at art. 43. 
128 BENVENISTI, supra note 119, at 29–31. 
129 This sentence should be qualified. The Military Commander issued Proclamation 
no. 3 (June 1967) in which he instructed military tribunal in the area to apply the Fourth 
Geneva Convention and that in case of conflict between the Convention the Proclamation,  
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to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War was not 
applicable on the WBGS.130 The government of Israel however 
declared that it would apply the humanitarian provisions of the 
convention without providing any list. The Israeli High Court of 
Justice applied the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention in so 
far as they embody customary rules of international law. The case law 
of the High Court has produced a curious list of those rules that were 
considered de facto applicable as customary international law.  
Specifically, the High Court ruled that Article 49 prohibiting 
deportation for individuals representing security threat is inapplicable, 
while Article 78 allowing occupying power to impose assigned 
residence or to intern populations in the occupied territories for 
imperative reasons of security is applicable because it embodies a 
customary rule of international law.131 At the same time, the High 
Court did not question the applicability of The Hague Regulations. 
Israel also contested the applicability of the law of occupation in toto 
in two recent instances; namely, in Area A as designated by the Oslo 
accords, and in the wake of the Gaza disengagement.132 The positions 
of the Israeli government on the question of applicability were highly 
contested. The United Nations, the ICRC, and the states parties to the 
Geneva Conventions have all asserted the applicability the 
international law of occupation including the Fourth Geneva 
Conventions.133 
The applicability of the international law of occupation was also 
challenged indirectly and from the perspective of the occupied 
 
the convention shall prevail.  That section of the proclamation was amended later in 1967. 
See RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER’S LAW: ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK (1985); Advisory 
Opinion, supra note 100, at 173–74. 
130 See The Colonization of the West Bank Territories by Israel, Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturalization of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 
9 (1977) (statement of Professor Yehuda Blum). For a review of the Israeli position, see 
Review of the Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, HARVARD PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT 
RESEARCH (July 2004), http://www.ihlresearch.org/opt/feature.php?a=31. See also 
BENVENISTI, supra note 119, at 108–24; Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupations: 
The Israeli Occupied Territories Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 44, 60–70 (1990). 
131 HARVARD PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT REESEARCH, 
supra note 130. 
132 See Disengagement Plan of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Apr. 16, 2004, available 
at http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/DisengageSharon_eng.htm (last updated Jan. 
20, 2010). 
133 Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, 44 HARV. J. INT’L L. 65, 97 (2003) (footnote 283 and accompanying text). 
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populations of the WBGS. These challenges usually took the form of 
arguments for the concurrent application of norms of international 
human rights law in addition to the law of occupation.134 
Although most legal commentators discuss Israeli occupation 
policies from the perspective of the international law of human rights 
and of military occupations, it is unclear how these hermeneutic 
debates determined the direction and substance of occupation 
policies. In fact, and except for few and arguably very important 
exceptions, the High Court generally turned down petitions 
challenging the government’s actions whether dealing with security 
measures,135 or with economic policies in the WBGS.136 According to 
Ronen Shamir, between 1967 and 1986, the Palestinians of the 
WBGS submitted to the High Court 557 petitions, only 65 of which 
were adjudicated.137 The High Court ruled for the petitioners in only 
five out of the sixty-five petitions.138 
It is even less clear how the debates about the applicability of 
humanitarian law or the legality of Israeli policies contribute 
analytically to understanding governance in the WBGS, or to assess 
the outcome of Israeli policies both in concrete cases and 
cumulatively. What is interesting in the landmark cases, in which the 
high court ruled against the government, was that although these 
decisions granted some relief to individual litigants, they did not alter 
the underlying policy objectives. Consider the often cited example of 
the Elon Moreh case. The Court’s decision “did not challenge the 
legality of expropriations in general,” but simply brought to the 
foreground a legal vulnerability attached to expropriations of private 
property justified by military necessity.139 What is even more 
interesting is that the Court did emphasize the distinction between 
 
134 Id. See also supra note 122; Advisory Opinion, supra note 100, 177–81. 
135 BENVENISTI, supra note 119, at 118–23. 
136 HC 69/81 Bassil Abu Aita et al. v. The Regional Commander of Judea and Samaria 
et al. [1983] (Isr.). The official High Court translation of the decision is available at 
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137 Ronen Shamir, “Landmark Cases” and the Reproduction of Legitimacy: The Case 
of Israel’s High Court of Justicei 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 781, 802 (1990). 
138 Id. The five cases are HCJ 390/79 Dweikat et al. v. Government of Israel et al. 
[1979] (Isr.) The remaining four as cited by Shamir are HCJ 320/80 Kawasme et al. v. 
Minister of Defense; HCJ 2/79 El Asad v. Minister of Interior HCJ 351/80 Jerusalem 
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139 BENVENISTI, supra note 119, at 173. 
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seizing private property for military necessity, and administering state 
lands as two different bases for the military commander to gain 
possession of property in occupied territory that merit different legal 
treatments.140 As mentioned earlier, declaring land possessed by the 
Palestinians as state land became after the Elon Moreh decision the 
most effective legal route to gain control over land in the WBGS.141 
Shamir, relying on the example of the Elon Moreh decision, 
convincingly argued that debating occupation policies in the courts, at 
least among Israeli ruling elites, had the unintended cost of 
legitimating the system of administration in the WBGS.142 
Legitimation for Shamir is a symbolic effect.  Concretely it is 
reducible to a sense of enchantment with the promises of change 
through law, and with the ability of the institutions of the state to live 
up to its democratic pretentions. But symbolic legitimation still leaves 
completely unanswered the question of what determined the 
substantive content and the direction of occupation policies. What the 
example of the Elon Moreh decision reveals is that there are probably 
structural determinants that cannot be captured from the perspective 
of legal condemnation. This perspective assumes that Israeli policies 
in the WBGS and the structure of government associated with them 
are determined by and respond to their special character as military 
areas, occupied and then administered by Israel in the course of an 
armed conflict. The focus on the WBGS as military areas reifies a 
legal distinction (law of war vs. law of peace), and presents it as an 
irreducible element of the governance regime in force. 
In the Elon Moreh decision, an important question was the 
relationship between the order of the military commander to seize the 
lands adjacent to the village of Rujeib (on a hill top east of the 
Jerusalem Nablus Road)143 for military purposes, the earlier 
demonstrations by persons belonging to the settler movement Gush 
Emunim in the same area, and the discussions in the wake of these 
demonstrations that took place in the ministerial defense committee 
 
140 See HCJ 390/79 Dweikat, et al. v. Government of Israel et al, [1979] (Isr.), supra 
note 5, at 142 of the cited English translation. 
141 According to statistics compiled by B’Tselem, at the end of 2007, the number of 
Israeli citizens living in the settlement Elon Moreh is 1,322. See B’Tselem, Land 
Expropriation and Settlements, http://www.btselem.org/settlements/statistics (last updated 
Jan. 21, 2010). 
142 Shamir, supra note 137, at 795. 
143 1 PAL. Y. B. INT’L L. 134, 136 (1984) (translating HCJ 390/79 Dweikat v. 
Government of Israel [1979] (Isr.)). 
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resulting in the decision to create the Elon Moreh settlement. The 
question that the case was reduced to was whether the land seizure 
order was an implementation of a political decision to settle, or 
actually necessary for the defense of the state. In other words, the 
court had to sort out the ambiguity in the institutional design of the 
state and in the discourse of rulers with respect to jurisdictional 
boundaries (the armistice line of 1949) but also about the 
determinants of occupation policies. What the case revealed was that, 
already in the 1980s, the settlement policy was driven by and reactive 
to broader political forces and social processes that cannot be 
contained within the armistice line of 1949, especially when the 
legitimacy and viability of this line are in question. 
In this context, the interpretation of Article 52 of The Hague 
Regulations is only an element in an elaborate regime that frames the 
competition between two complex national groups over the control of 
territory. The central categories in this regime are territory and 
demography. This means that the unfolding of the occupation regime 
is determined by specific policy objectives with respect to the 
management of population growth and movement, and to the 
management of space. Other important consequences of the 
occupation policies (e.g., distribution of water resources) are 
determined by the policy objectives with regard to territory and 
demography. This regime can be described as ethnocratic because it 
“facilitates the expansion, ethnicization, and control of a dominant 
ethnic nation (often termed the charter or titular group) over contested 
territory and polity.”144 This regime is not unique to governing the 
WBGS, but an extension of processes internal to the Israeli polity that 
took shape in the period between 1948 and 1967, and that determined 
the distribution of territory and resources between Palestinian Arabs, 
Mizrahi and Ashkenazi Jews.145 In this process, the legal system was 
instrumental in so far as it provided the instruments to channel 
resources, and consolidate the control over territory.146 Multiple legal 
regimes were deployed in tandem including property law, 
 
144 YIFTACHEL, supra note 32, at 11. 
145 Id. On the territorial restructuring in Israel and the role of land policy and property 
rules in creating ethnic hierarchies, see also Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, The Legal 
Transformation of Ethnic Geography: Israeli Law and the Palestinian Landholder 1948-
1967, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 923 (2001). 
146 For a study of other contexts in which the legal system, particularly property rules, 
were used to distribute land along ethnic lines, see Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and 
Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
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immigration, tax laws, local government, and zoning. What is specific 
about the WBGS, is that these legal regimes were supplemented by 
the international law of occupation and the legal and institutional 
framework for foreign aid. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the establishment of Israel’s control in the WBGS in 1967, 
the international legal strategy for the Palestinian national struggle 
consisted in asserting and obtaining the recognition for the right of the 
Palestinian people to self-determination and the right of return. A key 
element in this legal strategy was the recognition of the WBGS as 
occupied territories within the meaning of International Humanitarian 
Law and the applicability of the international law of occupation as 
embodied in The Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. As occupied territories, Israel would not be entitled to 
acquire sovereign title over the WBGS. The law of occupation was 
considered an interim regime in which the rights and privileges of the 
occupants are limited by the right of the occupied to self-
determination: 
 Occupied people continue in fact to have an existence of their 
own, in the absence of which the legal institution of belligerent 
occupation would cease to have any degree of autonomy: it 
becomes indeed inconceivable if the occupier gains sovereignty of 
the occupied territory. This definition holds true in all 
circumstances and allows one to distinguish the criterion of the 
rights of the occupier, which find their absolute limits in the respect 
of the sovereign rights of the people whose territory is occupied.147 
This international legal strategy culminated in the recent United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution to accord “Palestine non-
member observer state status in the United Nations.”148 
This legal representation of the status of the WBGS was also, with 
minor variations at the edges, the core of the legal positions of the 
United Nations, state actors and governmental and nongovernmental 
humanitarian relief and development assistance agencies active in the 
WBGS. In addition it constitutes a key starting point for peace 
initiatives including the one culminated in the Oslo accords. 
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But this legal strategy had also a dark side. Throughout the 
duration of Israel’s effective control over the WBGS, the law of 
occupation became constitutive of a regime of subordination aiming 
at the acquisition of land, and the control of Palestinian populations.  
It produced the paradoxical situation that Adam Roberts cautioned 
against in which: 
 [. . .] the law on occupations could be so used as to have the 
effect of leaving a whole population in legal and political limbo: 
neither entitled to citizenship of the occupying state, nor able to 
exercise any other political rights except of the most rudimentary 
character.149 
In this paper I attempted to provide a schematic description of 
governance in the WBGS. As a critical protocol I attempted to offer a 
legal/institutional account of how the WBGS are governed but from a 
perspective outside the legal framework of the law of occupation. I 
demonstrated that at least since the outbreak of the Second Intifada 
(but possibly since the signing of the Oslo Accords), the legal status 
of the WBGS could hardly fit the template of the law of occupation.  
From the perspective of a power that effectively control a contested 
territory, the governance challenge in the WBGS has become 
demographic, more specifically one of enforcing the containment of a 
group of people in enclave spaces. The responsibility to insure public 
order and safety has been transferred to authority buffers namely the 
Palestinian Authority, bilateral donor countries, and international 
humanitarian relief and development assistance agencies. 
Perhaps this a moment in which one should consider the daunting 
possibility that the costs of a legal strategy based on a necessary link 
between asserting Palestinian right to self-determination and asserting 
the continued relevance of the legal regime of occupation are too 
high. The post-Oslo regime is undesirable on consequentialist 
grounds; it is also objectionable on normative grounds. A regime of 
Israeli control over the WBGS that gives the occupier military control 
without responsibility over civilians has maximized the ability of the 
occupier to inflict harm on the occupied civilian population in the 
form of destruction of the infrastructure necessary to the provisions of 
key public services such as health, education, transportation and 
power; and suffocation of whatever productive capacity in the hands 
of the occupied population. It also minimized for the occupier, the 
costs of maintaining indefinitely this system of control by transferring 
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its costs to authority buffers such as the institutions of the Palestinian 
Authority and its donors. The post Oslo regime of Israeli control over 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is objectionable on normative 
grounds because it is perpetuating Palestinian subordination and 
forcing on the Palestinians a particular unviable final settlement of the 
conflict that is unrepresentative of the political dynamics inside the 
Palestinian polity in the WBGS, inside the green line and in exile. The 
challenge is ultimately to imagine a legal framework for 
understanding the situation in the WBGS that does not link the 
Palestinian right to self-determination to the law of occupation. 
